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INTRODUCTION
In a democratic society, the people are both the authors and subjects
of the law, but what that means varies from democratic theory to democratic
theory. For deliberative democrats, or proponents of deliberative democracy,
the authority to give law and the reason to accept the law as legitimate and
binding is partially grounded in the deliberation of the people.1 Worded
another way, if a democratic society is to have coercive authority over the
people under its jurisdiction, then for the deliberative democrat that coercive
power is constrained, or justified, by the deliberative activities of those same
people.2 Different deliberative theorists vary in their understanding of those
deliberative activities.3 This article does not seek to present or defend a
particular deliberative theory; rather the approach is meta-theoretical: to
identify some positive features of deliberative democratic theories. The best
way to identify these features is by analyzing the inadequacies of particular
deliberative theories.
To begin the discussion, John Rawls’ idea of public reason will be
presented as a foil to contrast with Robert Talisse’s recent pragmatist inquiry
approach to deliberative democracy.4 Part I will present some important
*

Assistant Professor, Virginia State University; Ph.D., Philosophy, Saint Louis University.
See, e.g., AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? 3
(2004) (explaining that deliberative democracy’s “most important characteristic, then, is its
reason-giving requirement”) [hereinafter GUTMANN & THOMPSON].
2
See, e.g., John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS
ON REASON AND POLITICS 93 (James Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997).
3
See infra Part I.
4
See infra Part I.
1
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insights and some shortcomings of Rawls’ theory.5 Part II will then present
Talisse’s inquiry account of deliberative democracy; focusing on how Talisse
accommodates what is right about Rawls’ theory–yet avoids some of its
weaknesses.6 Part III continues the ideas in Part II, but with a focus on the
limitations of Talisse’s pragmatist inquiry. Finally, Part IV demonstrates
what an adequate deliberative theory might look like while discovering how
Rawls’s and Talisse’s theories seem inadequate.7
I.

RAWLS AND THE IDEA OF PUBLIC REASON

Because of the abundance of literature concerning Rawls’ theory of
public reason, this article focuses only on giving a rough sketch of some of
its key features; showing some strengths and fundamental weaknesses of his
theory. The discussion of Rawls is used here as a heuristic device both to
highlight the strengths of Talisse’s account and to help discover some
desirable features–which a good deliberative theory should take seriously.
One of the most important aspects of Rawls’ theory, is that he
identifies the central problem of democracy.8 According to Rawls, a
fundamental feature of modern democratic societies is the existence of
pluralism.9 The idea is that, as a matter of fact, there will be “a plurality of
conflicting reasonable comprehensive doctrines, religious, philosophical, and
moral, [which] is the normal result of its culture of free institutions.”10
Pluralism is not merely a historical accident. Pluralism arises as a natural
result of the institutions of modern democratic societies and is therefore a
permanent feature.11
The existence of pluralism is especially problematic for deliberative
democracy. If people in a democratic society are going to be vulnerable to
the coercive power of the society, then they need to view the use of coercive
power as legitimate in some sense. In republican terms, people in a
5

See infra Part I.
See infra Part II. While I take Talisse to be an improvement on Rawls, there are still some
crucial problems that Talisse does not solve.
7
Although suggesting an adequate deliberative theory is beyond the scope of this article,
some important ways in which deliberative democratic theory might progress will be
suggested.
8
See generally John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 765
(1997) [hereinafter Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited].
9
Id. at 765.
10
Id. at 766.
11
John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 1, 4
(1987) [hereinafter Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus].
6
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democratic society need to see the use of coercive power as non-arbitrary
interference with their lives.12 If people are to be subject to the coercive power
of society, then they must have some reason to think that the coercive power
is being used legitimately. Moreover, in a democracy, the people are the ones
who authorize the use of coercive power; and in a deliberative democracy the
deliberation of the people grounds the use of that coercive power, and
justifies accepting the use of coercive power as legitimate.13
If all that is true, then the problem presented to the deliberative
democrat is that (in at least some cases) many people will have good reason
not to accept—or no good reason to accept—society’s use of coercive power.
If the justification for the legitimate use of coercive power requires members
of the society to see the use of that power as reasonable—and since many
members of the society will fundamentally disagree about what counts as a
good reason—then at least in some, and perhaps many, cases the use of
coercive power will not be seen as legitimate. After all, pluralism is
permanent and implies that at least some comprehensive doctrines will be
mutually exclusive. The implication is that if a society is deemed illegitimate
by some of its members, then at best the society would be unstable, and at
worst unjust.
Rawls attempts to solve this problem with the idea of public reason.14
For Rawls, there may be widespread disagreement at the level of
comprehensive doctrines—i.e., broadly shared worldviews that include
beliefs and values regarding morality, politics, religion as well as personal
and political beliefs about how a society ought to operate.15 This is because
of the existence of pluralism, which allows for “overlapping consensus”16 of
reasons among all reasonable doctrines—which can be used to justify the
society’s use of coercive power. Rawls points to public reason as the
overlapping consensus.17
This article discusses two problematic features of Rawls’s
understanding of public reason: (1) public reason is too restrictive both in
12

See, e.g., PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT
(Oxford University Press 1997).
13
See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 3.
14
See generally Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 8.
15
See Paul Voice, Comprehensive Doctrine, in THE CAMBRIDGE RAWLS LEXICON 126 (Jon
Mandle & David A. Reidy eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2014).
16
Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, supra note 11, at 1.
17
Id.

2020

THINKING ABOUT DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY

137

about what is deliberated, and what reasons can be used in deliberation; and
(2) the reason for accepting the constraints of public reason is too contingent,
lacking the normative weight to properly motivate citizens to accept those
constraints. Whether Rawls has adequate responses to address these concerns
or whether they are ultimately problematic extends beyond the scope of this
article. However, if another deliberative theory does not face these problems,
then that theory would be preferable to Rawls’.
As to the first issue that the idea of public reason is too restrictive,
Rawls explicitly states that the content of public reason—i.e., the issues
about which citizens deliberate—is limited to discussions of constitutional
essentials and the basic structure of society.18 Further, deliberating citizens
are supposed to limit themselves to only offering reasons that they
“reasonably think that other citizens might also reasonably accept those
reasons.”19
Restricting public deliberation to constitutional essentials and
questions about the basic structure of society is problematic because much of
society’s coercive power involves political actions and policies that do not
relate directly to the basic structure or constitutional essentials. Importantly,
“principles governing social and economic inequalities” seem to fall outside
the constitutional essentials and basic structure.20 Now, one might say that
these issues would be resolved by a well-structured constitution and society.
Even so, public deliberation should occur at some point down-stream from
how the constitution is set up if the political actions of society are to be seen
as legitimate or justified.
Perhaps one of Rawls’s motivations for limiting public reason to the
basic structure and constitutional essentials, is that the reasons which can be
offered in public deliberation do not seem to deal with more substantive
issues. When discussing constitutional essentials, regardless of any particular
individual’s comprehensive doctrine, it seems that appealing to ideas such as
fair and equal treatment under the law or “liberty of conscience”21 would
provide reasons that all, or most, citizens could reasonably accept. However,
when discussing who can and cannot get married, for example, appealing to
18

See Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 8.
See id. at 771.
20
Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason, supra note 2, at 107.
21
Nicholas G. Karambelas, Where the First Amendment Comes From, 50 MD. B.J. 4, 10
(2017) (defining liberty of conscience as “the freedom to follow one’s religious or ethical
beliefs”).
19
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biblical authority is only a reason for those who hold that the bible is
authoritative, and thus is a reason that is reasonably rejected. Certainly, one
could not offer biblical authority as a reason to justify some aspect of the
basic structure of society and could offer fair and equal treatment as a reason
to justify the society’s recognition of non-traditional marriages. However, it
appears that Rawls seems to think that there will be more consensus regarding
constitutional essentials.22 For the religious and non-religious alike, fair and
equal treatment and similar types of reasons could be seen as sufficient for
justifying universal suffrage. However, for many religious people fair and
equal treatment would not be sufficient to justify recognizing non-traditional
marriage, and any reasons that might be sufficient for deciding the case either
way would be reasonably rejected by other citizens.23 Thus, the restrictions
public reason places on public discourse are problematic.
Rawls might be right, but if another theory could allow for
deliberation to occur over a greater range of topics, and not lead to
countervailing problems, it would certainly be a good thing. If the
deliberation of citizens were active at multiple levels of societal policymaking, and if citizens were allowed to offer reasons precluded by Rawls’s
public reason theory, it seems likely that those same citizens would feel that
society’s actions were justified. More importantly, if society took at least
some of the reasonably rejectable reasons of citizens seriously it is likely that
citizens would be more invested in society, which in turn would lead to a
more stable society.24 On Rawls’s account, either one offers and accepts the
limited use of reasons, or one is completely ignored, creating tension and
animosity.25
Disallowing certain reasons and restricting deliberation has a
tendency to create tension and animosity in society. Thus, from a Rawlsian
perspective there needs to be explanation as to why citizens within a polity
would even agree to have deliberation restricted in precisely the way Rawls
suggests.26 There are two reasons Rawls offers that would provide citizens
22

See Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 8.
Clarity Regarding Same Sex Marriage, Capitol Ministries (Jan. 22, 2018), https://capmin.
org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Clarity-Regarding-Same-Sex-Marriage-Ralph-Drollinger2018.pdf.
24
See generally THOM BROOKS & FABIAN FREYENHAGEN, THE LEGACY OF JOHN RAWLS
(2005) [hereinafter BROOKS & FREYENHAGEN].
25
See generally Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 8.
26
See generally id. at 766.
23
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reason to adhere to public reason: the idea of overlapping consensus 27 and a
duty of civility;28 each of which will be discussed in turn. However, the
problem is that neither of these reasons has the normative weight to
sufficiently motivate people to be bound by public reason.
Even though there is a plurality of comprehensive doctrines which
citizens can, and do, hold within a free democratic society, Rawls is only
concerned with reasonable ones.29 The reasonable doctrines of citizens will,
generally, converge on a political conception of justice that will motivate
them to follow public reason. There are at least two problems with the
overlapping consensus that call into question whether it is sufficiently
normative to be motivational. First, whether comprehensive doctrines
overlap in the way necessary for public reason to occur is a purely contingent
matter; and therefore lacks the modal strength to be normatively
motivational. Second, what counts as a “reasonable doctrine” is either
question-begging or does not dissolve the tension that could arise within a
pluralistic society where the voices of certain citizens are necessarily
excluded.
Regarding the former issue, public reason is supposed to mediate
between doctrines that seem to mutually exclude each other’s conceptions of
the good, the right, and the true.30 However, if there is such a plurality of
doctrines, it is at least possible that the doctrines would not be able to
converge on a similar enough conception of justice to encourage the citizens
to hold to the strictures of public reason. It might be true that in the actual
world there is such an overlapping consensus. However, there is nothing that
would guarantee that there would be a consensus, or that if there were such a
consensus that it would remain. Further, to suggest that there are certain facts
about human nature or psychology that leads one to expect that there will be
such a consensus is not a move readily available to Rawls or the Rawlsian.31
To do so would be to introduce a reasonably rejectable understanding of
human nature at a meta-level and to ground the fact that one is not allowed
to introduce reasonably rejectable conceptions at the political level. The
27

See Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, supra note 11.
BROOKS & FREYENHAGEN, supra note 24, at 29.
29
See generally Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 8; Rawls, The Idea
of an Overlapping Consensus, supra note 11.
30
See Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 8.
31
Rawls actually does make such an appeal to human psychology. See Rawls, The Idea of
an Overlapping Consensus, supra note 11, at 22.
28
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upshot, however, is that since an overlapping consensus is so contingent and
fragile, it does not seem that it could justify the use of public reason in the
way Rawls’s theory needs.
One move available to Rawls, and in fact the one he makes, is that the
overlapping consensus need only be among the reasonable doctrines.32 Thus,
the problematic is dissolved precisely because it is reasonable to think that
there might be some overlap and convergence among reasonable doctrines.33
However, appealing to the reasonableness of doctrines has problems of its
own. If it is a fairly broad notion of what counts as reasonable, then the
possible doctrines may not sufficiently overlap, or if they do, there is no
guarantee that the consensus will be stable. Yet, if it is a fairly restricted
notion of what counts as reasonable, perhaps guaranteeing the overlapping
consensus, then there is the potential for alienating a significant enough
number of citizens. This would result in a destabilizing effect on society,
which would cause Rawls to beg the question in his defense of a liberal
polity.34
Rawls seems to take the latter alternative. Rawls’s overall project is
to defend a liberal polity, going so far as to claim that he “believe[s] that in
fact any workable conception of justice for a democratic regime must indeed
be in an appropriate sense liberal.”35 Yet it seems inappropriate for Rawls to
have grounded a liberal political conception of justice on the fact that
reasonable doctrines will converge on such a conception. As a reasonable
doctrine is one that has a political conception of justice which is broadly
liberal. Rawls explains what a reasonable doctrine is:
When political liberalism speaks of a reasonable overlapping
consensus of comprehensive doctrines, it means that all of
these doctrines, both religious and nonreligious, support a
political conception of justice underwriting a constitutional
democratic society whose principles, ideals, and standards
satisfy the criterion of reciprocity. Thus, all reasonable
doctrines affirm such a society with its corresponding political
institutions: equal basic rights and liberties for all citizens,
32

See BROOKS & FREYENHAGEN, supra note 24.
See Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, supra note 11.
34
Cf. Matteo Bonnati, Political Liberalism, Free Speech and Public Reason, 14 EUROPEAN
J. POL. THEORY 180 (2006).
35
Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, supra note 11, at 5.
33
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including liberty of conscience and the freedom of religion.
On the other hand, comprehensive doctrines that cannot
support such a democratic society are not reasonable. 36
Thus, Rawls has not justified a liberal polity; he has stipulated it.
Even if one were to follow Rawls this far, he has not really solved the
problem of pluralism. Pluralism arises not as an aberration but when a
democratic free society is functioning as it is supposed to.37 It is thus possible
that many citizens will come to hold non-liberal, and thus unreasonable,
comprehensive doctrines, raising the specter of the contingency, tension, and
animosity. The only apparent solution would be a modus vivendi38
compromise—something Rawls is at pains to avoid.39
Assume that Rawls is right about reasonableness and that there will
be a convergence on a political conception of justice that is not
problematically contingent or exclusionary. Any reasonable political
conception of justice, according to Rawls, satisfies “the criterion of
reciprocity,” which is understood as a duty of civility.40 It is this duty which
provides the real normative force for citizens to limit their deliberation to the
constraints of public reason.41
The duty of civility manifests as a willingness to respect other
citizens’ autonomy and liberty since “we sincerely believe that the reasons
we offer for our political action may reasonably be accepted by other citizens
as a justification of those actions.”42 In other words, the duty of civility
requires citizens to respect each other as reasonable and rational. When
justifying any political action, one attempts to persuade on the basis of
mutually agreeable, or reasonable, terms which others could reasonably
accept “as free and equal, and not as dominated or manipulated, or under the
pressure of an inferior political or social position.”43

36

Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 8, at 801 (emphasis added).
See Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, supra note 11.
38
Modus Vivendi, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining modus vivendi as a
Latin phase meaning “mode of life”). In this instance, it means a situation where parties
agree to live together peaceably without coming to any particular fixed agreement.
39
See Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, supra note 11, at 1.
40
See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993).
41
Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 8, at 803.
42
Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason, supra note 2, at 134.
43
Id. at 132.
37
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Two problems arise for the duty of civility because “[t]his duty, like
other political rights and duties, is an intrinsically moral duty.”44 First, it
appears that the duty is symmetrical. The limit on the duty of civility is the
fact that one should stick to the constraints of public reason “provided that
other citizens also accept those terms.”45 Thus, citizens who do not respect
the duty of civility are not owed the duty either; and therefore, can be
manipulated, dominated, or ignored; leading once again to the destabilizing
effect of tension and animosity among the citizenry.
The second problem is that since the duty of civility is simply one
moral duty among many, when the duty of civility conflicts with more
important duties, one need not be bound to the constraints of public reason.46
Even assuming that citizens generally accept the duty of civility and value
public reason, in very many cases, especially the hard ones, it is not
implausible to think that other duties would override the duty of civility,47
leading to a breakdown of public reason. Even if these conflicts were few and
far between, the fact that public reason might not be maintained when dealing
with the most important and difficult issues is gravely problematic since it is
the really difficult and important issues where public reason was supposed to
help.48
Three lessons can be learned from the discussion so far. First, any
adequate deliberative democratic theory must acknowledge the existence of
pluralism and be able to deal with the problems that occur because of it;
namely, the destabilizing influence that arises from the conflict and tension
inherent when a citizenry holds a diversity of potentially mutually exclusive
values. Second, if a political society has coercive power, then in a democratic
society the use of that power should, at least, be constrained by the people.
Therefore, all else held equal, in a deliberative democracy the broader the
scope about what can be deliberated, the better. Finally, if citizens are to
deliberate, there must be some normative reason that would compel citizens

44

Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 8, at 769.
Id. at 770.
46
See, e.g., Eric Brown, Rawls and the Duty of Civility, IWM JUNIOR VISITING FELLOWS
CONFERENCES 15 (2003), https://www.iwm.at/wp-content/uploads/jc-15-01.pdf.
47
Consider a parallel case where one is not bound by a promise when a more important
duty—e.g. saving someone’s life—interferes.
48
Micah Lott makes this point forcefully. See Micah Lott, Restraint on Reasons and Reasons
for Restraint: A Problem for Rawls’ Ideal of Public Reason, 87 PAC. PHIL. Q. 75 (2006).
45
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to deliberate in general, and to deliberate in the ways required by a particular
deliberative theory.
II.

TALISSE AND PRAGMATIST INQUIRY

Turning to Robert Talisse’s inquiry account of deliberative
democracy to see how he deals with the three features of an ideal deliberative
democratic theory identified in the previous section. Talisse suggests that
based on epistemic norms, which all reasonable persons hold, we are already
committed to a particular form of inquiry.49 Further, he claims that those same
epistemic norms commit us to deliberative democratic politics.50 Although
Talisse has argued for this position in many places,51 the focus of this note
will be on how he has articulated it in his book, A Pragmatist Philosophy of
Democracy.52 Importantly, Talisse maintains that his pragmatist defense of
democracy can adequately deal with the existence of reasonable pluralism—
and is the only one that can.
Talisse’s argument is based on his understanding of C. S. Peirce’s
epistemology.53 Before getting into his justification of deliberative
democracy, it is important to understand Peirce and how Talisse interprets
him. Talisse begins by considering Peirce’s essay, The Fixation of Belief.54
In Fixation, Peirce “catalogue[s] four distinct ways in which we may attempt
to assuage doubt and settle belief. Each of these ways is, on Peirce’s view, a
method of inquiry.”55 The four modes of inquiry are: the method of tenacity,
the method of authority, the a priori method, and the method of science.56
According to Peirce, only the method of science can actually assuage doubt
49

See, e.g., Robert Talisse, Towards a Peircean Politics of Inquiry, 40 TRANSACTIONS OF
21 (2004).
50
Id.
51
Id.; see Robert Talisse, Deliberative Democracy Defended: A Response to Posner’s
Political Realism, 11 RES PUBLICA 185 (2005); Robert Talisse, Liberalism, Pluralism and
Political Justification, 13 THE HARVARD REV. OF PHIL. 57 (2005). In Deliberative
Democracy Defended: A Response to Posner’s Political Realism, he refers to his position as
Deweyan Democracy which seems ironic since Talisse has famously been quite critical of
Deweyans.
52
ROBERT TALISSE, Pierce, Inquiry, and Politics, in A PRAGMATIST PHILOSOPHY OF
DEMOCRACY 54 (2007) [hereinafter TALISSE, A PRAGMATIC PHILOSOPHY].
53
See Michael Bacon, The Politics of Truth: A Critique of Peircean Deliberative Democracy,
36 PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL CRITICISM 2 (2010).
54 See C. S. Peirce, The Fixation of Belief in AN ANTHOLOGY OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY
AMERICAN SCIENCE WRITING 210 (C.R. Resetarits ed., 2012).
55
See TALISSE, A PRAGMATIC PHILOSOPHY, supra note 52, at 56.
56
See id.
THE CHARLES S. PEIRCE SOC’Y
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and settle belief, because only the method of science is a method of belief
refinement while the other forms of inquiry are aimed at belief preservation.
The tenacious believer dogmatically clings to his or her beliefs, ignoring all
counter evidence; the authoritarian believer defers all judgment to a supposed
authority; and the a priori believer settles belief through agreement with
social convention.57
Contrary to many commentators on Peirce, Talisse believes that
Peirce is not putting forward the method of science as the correct form of
inquiry and then evaluating the other forms of inquiry against it. Rather,
Peirce is providing an immanent critique of our epistemic practices and
showing that only the method of science satisfies the epistemic norms we
already hold. According to Talisse:
Peirce’s argument is that the non-scientific methods fail to
satisfy some condition that is internal to inquiry, and therefore
we cannot self-consciously adopt them . . . . Put in another
way, Peirce’s argument is not so much recommending to us
the scientific method as he is showing us that—given what we
already take inquiry to be, and given what we already
understand the point of inquiry to be—we have no choice but
to reject all but the scientific method.58
Peirce, according to Talisse, begins from the assumption that “we are
reasoning creatures...[w]e engage instinctively in acts of inferring, deducing,
guessing, hypothesizing, and experimenting with a view towards predicting
and preparing ourselves for future happenings.”59 In essence, we are naturally
inquirers. Peirce’s self-understood explicit aim in Fixation is to understand
the various ways individuals inquire. The various methods of inquiry are not
merely “algorithm[s] that an inquirer enacts when confronted with doubt; a
method of inquiry entails a wide range of habits and commitments that run
beyond the particular beliefs it produces.”60 In fact, the four modes of inquiry
should be understood as “epistemic character-types” or “four kinds of
believer.”61

57

See id. at 61.
Id. at 59.
59
Id. at 60.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 61.
58
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Therefore, according to Peirce, the tenacious believer’s epistemic
character is fundamentally dogmatic while the authoritarian and a priori
believers are deferential. Most importantly these believers are not responsive
to reasons. “The scientific believer, by contrast, attempts not to preserve
existing beliefs, but to discover beliefs that will not occasion doubt. To
accomplish this, the scientific believer seeks beliefs that are responsive to
reasons, evidence, and argument.”62 In this way, the scientific believer aims
at having, in some sense, true beliefs, or beliefs that are truth-apt, and the
scientific believer’s character is epistemically responsible.
Not only are the non-scientific methods of inquiry flawed, but the
corresponding character traits are self-undermining. “A belief, in order to be
a belief, is such that it is responsive to . . . reasons and evidence. That is a
very part of what is to have a belief—a constitutive norm of belief” 63 is that
a belief is something that one holds for reasons. Talisse suggests that Peirce’s
purpose in Fixation is to point out, on the one hand, that the non-scientific
methods violate this constitutive norm, and on the other hand, that no nonscientific believer can self-consciously adopt a non-scientific method.64 He
believes this for two reasons. First, the non-scientific believer, in order to
preserve his or her belief, must aim to have true beliefs—i.e., reasonresponsive beliefs—about his or her dogmatic and deferential practices.
Second, Peirce realized that one seldom, if ever, maintains a belief when one
recognizes that “it was produced by means of a method that has no truthtracking or reason-responsive propensities. . . . [In other words,] nonscientific believers take themselves to be scientific inquirers.”65 Thus, nonscientific modes of inquiry entail an epistemic character that is self-deluded.
There are certain requirements for being an epistemically responsible agent,
which, according to Talisse and Peirce, is what we all take ourselves to be.66
Only scientific inquirers are self-controlled and self-aware in the way
necessary to be epistemically responsible. Therefore, we are already
committed to scientific inquiry, and the character traits that are entailed by it.

62

Id. at 61.
Cheryl Misak, Making Disagreement Matter: Pragmatism and Deliberative Democracy,
18 J. OF SPECULATIVE PHIL. 9, 12 (2004).
64
See TALISSE, A PRAGMATIC PHILOSOPHY, supra note 52.
65
Id. at 62.
66
See id. at 54.
63
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There is an important upshot of Peirce’s epistemology: a political
one. Talisse argues that the same norms which govern inquiry, and the same
character traits that make an individual an epistemically responsible agent,
entail a commitment to deliberative democracy.68 There is the obvious fact
that individuals do not exist in isolation and that beliefs are influenced by
social relations. Thus, “[a]ny method of inquiry which does not aim to settle
belief in the community cannot successfully avoid doubt”—precisely the
point of inquiry.69
A distinguishing characteristic of the method of science is that it alone
“recognizes that the truth is ‘public’ and available to all who inquire
properly.”70 The non-scientific methods, by contrast, hold that truth—if it
exists—is in some way dependent on “something human and private.”71 The
tenacious inquirer holds that truth is dependent on him or herself, and actually
seeks to avoid the beliefs of others in fear that they might unseat his or her
beliefs.72 The authoritarian inquirer holds that truth is dependent on a single
authority, and the a priori inquirer holds that truth is dependent on some
group’s “feelings and purposes.”73
Talisse maintains that each form of inquiry aligns with a certain form
of political order and social organization, which should be readily apparent
from the epistemic characteristics of that form of inquiry and the view of truth
that it holds.74 This method of tenacity is radically anarchic: the individual is
the sole locus of concern and the beliefs of each are completely independent;
the method of authority commits one to an extreme form of Orwellian
authoritarianism;75 and a priori method commits one to a version of epistemic
aristocracy and thus to aristocratic rule.76 Importantly, each of these forms of
political organization is self-defeating, or unstable, in the same way that the
67
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corresponding method of inquiry is: at some point the method breaks down
and doubt arises. There is no perfect way for one to avoid all interaction with
others and realizing that others hold different views occasions doubt. Thus,
anarchy cannot be maintained. No matter how powerful the authoritarian
dictator, he or she cannot prevent his or her subjects from being exposed to
doubt-inducing reasons. Further, the authoritarian dictator is implicitly
committed to Pierce’s scientific method to be able to successfully maintain
his or her rule. Finally, the same holds true, mutatis mutandis,77 for
aristocracy and the a priori method.
According to Talisse, these forms of political organization are all
incompatible with self-controlled and properly conducted inquiry.78
Therefore, one cannot be an epistemically responsible agent under these types
of political conditions. Further, as Talisse and Pierce have argued scientific
inquiry is the only form of inquiry, which is epistemically responsible.79
Thus, by that very fact, one is committed to the idea that truth is public.
Moreover, scientific inquiry is also committed to the idea that “the method of
inquiry must, at least potentially, involve the participation of the entire
community.”80 Indeed, scientific inquiry commits one to belonging to a
community of inquirers, since it is only in community that one’s beliefs can
be tested and corrected. As Talisse suggests, “[t]he Peircean image of a
community of inquiry is inherently democratic.”81
The idea is that the scientific method requires epistemic agents to be
open to correction, constantly willing to revise his or her beliefs in light of
new arguments and evidence. In turn, this requires responsible believers to
engage in reason-exchange and openness to disagreement and opposing
views. The lesson which Talisse, therefore draws is that:
Accordingly, there are social and political requirements for
proper inquiry: Inquirers need access to forums in which
inquiry can be engaged; they need to be able to appeal to
reliable sources of information and news; they need access to
77
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processes by which they can hold their representatives, and
their government more generally, accountable; they need the
freedom to engage controversial ideas and to speak, write, and
express themselves freely. In short, proper inquiry can be
practiced only within a democratic political order.82
In essence, the Peircean justification of democracy runs along the
same lines as the Peircean justification of the scientific method. Therefore,
the Peircean justification of democracy proceeds as an immanent critique of
the alternative theories. “The claim is that, just as we are all at least implicitly
scientific inquirers, we are all at least implicitly democrats simply by virtue
of the epistemic commitments that follow from the very phenomenon of
belief.”83 Of course, that is not to say that people do not practice nonscientific forms of inquiry, or that people are not anti-democratic. Talisse,
and by extension Peirce, are only claiming that we are all implicitly
committed to scientific inquiry and democracy whether we realize it or not.84
Not only do the norms implicit in our epistemic practices commit all
epistemic agents, who at least take themselves to be responsible, to
democracy, but it commits them to a particular type of democracy, namely a
deliberative one. Further:
[T]he responsible epistemic agent … is committed to a view
of citizenship according to which those who simply assert
their raw preferences in political debate and in decision
contexts are failing at democratic citizenship in the same way
the tenacious believer is failing at inquiry. Just as inquirers
must attend to reasons, argument, and evidence in forming
their beliefs, democratic citizens must engage each other’s
reasons. In this way, the Peircean view is an epistemic view of
democracy. . . . [Which] entails a political commitment on the
part of individuals to a state that promotes proper
citizenship. . . . [S]ince proper belief requires reason
exchanging, one cannot be a responsible epistemic agent in
isolation . . . . Hence a responsible epistemic community is
necessary for there to be individuals who are responsible
82
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epistemic agents. Moreover . . . the community of proper
inquiry must be cultivated and maintained by social
institutions that encourage the exercise of proper epistemic
agency.85
Pluralism should be addressed before returning to some of the
concerns that arise from the form of democracy that Talisse’s view entails.
According to Talisse, his view is fully consistent with the fact of pluralism.86
Because being an epistemically responsible agent requires not only engaging
others’ reasons but actively seeking out and engaging dissenting views,
Talisse maintains that pluralism enhances his conception of democracy.87 In
fact, one norm which Talisse believes is implicit in the scientific method is
something he calls “epistemic agonism, a norm of ongoing engagement with
those with whom one disagrees.”88 Further, because the same norms that
govern proper inquiry also commend a particular political arraignment, the
existence of pluralism requires agonistic politics. “Such a politics differs
from many forms of deliberative democracy in that it is not immediately
aimed at agreement or consensus. Rather, the Peircean conception of
democracy envisions an ongoing agonism between competing reasonable
claims, a perpetual argument within democracy concerning democracy
itself.”89 In this way, not only is the Peircean conception of democracy
consistent with pluralism, but, as Talisse suggests, it is actually improved by
it.90
The strengths of Talisse’s account should be readily apparent, but so
are some of its weaknesses. In some ways, it is precisely the strengths that
are its weaknesses. However, and more importantly, the larger issue is that
the entailments which Talisse draws from the norms which govern proper
inquiry do not seem to necessarily follow. Thus, this article will acknowledge
both the strengths and weaknesses of Talisse’s Peircean conception of
democracy.
The Peircean conception of democracy, articulated by Talisse, is a
substantive conception. It is inherently normative and aims to cultivate
85
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particular character traits among its citizens, in part, by having institutions
that promote and enhance proper epistemic practices.91 Thus, “the Peircean
view might be thought of as an epistemic perfectionist conception of
democracy, since its substance—and, correspondingly, its view of the
formative role of democratic politics—derives exclusively from our
epistemic commitments.”92
Generally, it has been argued that substantive conceptions of
democracy are inconsistent with the existence of pluralism.93 Any substantive
conception of democracy entails certain commitments that are reasonably
rejectable by epistemically responsible agents. However, Talisse maintains
that such criticisms do not apply to all substantive conceptions of
democracy.94 In particular, the epistemic norms that govern epistemic
perfectionism are not reasonably rejectable in the way moral norms or
metaphysical understandings of the good can be reasonably rejected. In order
to reasonably reject something, one must reject it for reasons, argue against
it, or offer evidence. Yet these things are all precisely the norms that are part
of epistemic perfectionism. Therefore, epistemic perfectionism as a
substantive account of democracy cannot be reasonably rejected.
III.

PROBLEMS FOR PRAGMATIST INQUIRY

In some ways, Talisse has a view similar to Rawls regarding how to
deal with the existence of pluralism. Rawls claimed that there would be an
overlapping consensus regarding a political conception of justice, for any
reasonable doctrine, and it is based on that overlapping consensus that
deliberation could begin.95 What Talisse offers is a more theoretical
understanding of overlapping consensus and what counts as a “reasonable
doctrine.” If Talisse is right and the norms articulated by epistemic
perfectionism are intrinsic to, and constitutive of, what it means to be a
91
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believer, then regardless of whatever position one holds regarding justice, or
the moral good, one cannot reasonably reject the epistemic norms of proper
inquiry.96 Thus, unlike Rawls, one need not hope that there will be an
overlapping consensus, since what it means to be an epistemic agent is
precisely the norms that govern democracy and deliberation.
Further, one need not offer reasons that one “reasonably think[s] that
other citizens might also reasonably accept those reasons.”97 It is merely the
willingness to offer reasons and engage in argument—precisely because
epistemic perfectionism does not aim at consensus or agreement. The only
way a view could not be considered is if the view is committed to epistemic
irresponsibility. Yet if Talisse is right, no view takes itself to be epistemically
irresponsible.98 Therefore, Talisse appears not to be subject to the
contingency and potential alienation of citizens that seemed to be problematic
for Rawlsian public reason.
Notice also that epistemic perfectionism seems to solve some of the
other issues that arise for Rawls. Public reason and overlapping consensus
seemed to lack the normative weight to encourage and guarantee deliberation.
By appealing to the epistemic norms that govern proper inquiry epistemic
perfectionism entails at least a prima facie obligation to deliberate. Part of
what is required to be an epistemically responsible believer is to engage in
argument and reason exchange; thus, again if Talisse is right, deliberation is
normatively required. Certainly, some citizens within a polity may refuse to
deliberate, but that is a practical issue. The normative force behind
deliberation is still there.
Finally, public reason limits deliberation to just constitutional
essentials and the basic structure of society.99 Epistemic perfectionism
requires that deliberation should be about any judgment, value, position, or
policy.100 In order to be an epistemically responsible agent one is committed
to ongoing deliberation about anything truth-apt or reason responsive. Hence,
96
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the same will hold for any political judgment or policy. There is no limit on
what can or should be deliberated.
Overall, it seems that Talisse’s Peircean conception of democracy
fairs better than Rawlsian public reason as an account of deliberative
democracy. However, there are some concerns that arise about whether it is
actually an adequate account of deliberative democratic politics. Three main
worries will be considered here regarding epistemic perfectionist deliberative
democracy. First, it is unclear whether the epistemic norms function the way
that Talisse thinks they do, and whether they are in fact the norms that
necessarily govern proper inquiry and epistemic responsibility. Second, it is
not clear that, even granting Talisse his epistemic norms, democracy is
entailed in the way that he thinks it is. Finally, even if Talisse is right about
the epistemic norms that govern proper inquiry, and that those norms entail a
deliberative democracy, Talisse’s account does not really solve the issue that
arises for democracy in light of pluralism. The problem that democracy must
address is a question of the legitimate use of the society’s coercive power.
The existence of pluralism raises the question of whether citizens can accept
it as legitimate.
Regarding the first issue of whether the norms he articulates do, in
fact, govern epistemic responsibility, Talisse states that “[t]he epistemic
commitments that lie at the core of Peircean democracy . . . state a set of
principles that are consistent with any well-developed epistemology. That is
internalists, externalists, foundationalists, coherentists, and so on . . . . ”101
However, the problem is that this does not seem to be the case. One can
imagine a strong externalist epistemological theory, such as reliabilism, that
would not endorse the Peircean view. Reliabilism claims that one knows or
believes is a psychological process, or was produced by a process that reliably
produces true beliefs.102
A reliable process does not need to be reason-responsive; it merely
needs to be reliable at producing true beliefs, regardless of whether the agent
knows that the process is reliable. The crux of Peircean inquiry is reasonresponsiveness, and therefore there is a sense in which it can reasonably be
rejected because there are ways of knowing that are truth-apt but not reasonresponsive. Similarly, some virtue epistemologists hold that tenacity and
101
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deference to authority can be epistemic virtues.103 Since, by definition such
“epistemic virtues” are inferior forms of inquiry, the Peircean cannot
countenance them. The point is that there are ways of knowing that seem
epistemically responsible—or at least not irresponsible—that are antiPeircean. Thus, Talisse cannot claim that Peircean epistemic perfectionism
“identifies and draws upon only those epistemic norms that are already
implicit within the epistemic practice of all believers.”104
Ultimately, the problem is that, though Talisse denies it, Peircean
epistemic perfectionism is tied to certain philosophical commitments that can
be rejected by epistemically responsible agents. For Talisse and Peirce to say
that a belief is true is to claim that it is indubitable, or that it would forever
withstand further objections. However, there is no reason to think that to
claim that something is true is to claim that it is indubitable. On a
correspondence theory of truth, a belief is true when it stands in a particular
relation to some mind independent “object.”105 On a disquotationalist theory
of truth “X” is true, just in case, X.106 Both of these theories of truth do not
require that beliefs be indubitable for them to be true. As another example,
some philosophers hold that chicken-sexers107 know the sex of baby chicks,
but at the same time their beliefs about the sex of chicks are dubitable, if not
dubious.108 In all these cases, one need not necessarily engage in further
Peircean inquiry, or withhold belief, simply because the belief does not
satisfy the Peircean requirement that true beliefs “would forever withstand
the scrutiny of inquiry . . . .”109
Although there is some intuitive force behind the Peircean account
which Talisse offers, and it certainly is an epistemically respectable view in
its own right, there are alternative epistemologies that are just as respectable
103
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that are, at least partially, inconsistent with Peircean inquiry. Thus, there can
be epistemically responsible agents that could reject the Peircean view;
therefore, Talisse cannot claim that “everyone” is committed to Peircean
inquiry and deliberative democracy.
Certainly, Talisse could claim that while all that has been suggested
is correct, it does not follow that Peircean epistemic perfectionism can be
“reasonably” rejected, and there is an obvious way that this is true. However,
notice the claim is not that it could be “reasonably” rejected, per se, but that
it could be rejected by “epistemically responsible agents” or “in some sense
reasonably rejected.”110 The wording here is important. However, it seems
that one could claim that one can “reasonably” reject Peircean inquiry in
precisely the way that Talisse thinks that one cannot. Talisse’s claim was that
in order to reasonably reject Peircean inquiry, one is already committed to
the epistemic norms it proscribes, such as offering reasons and evidence.111
The problem is that a successful argument would require the definition of
“reasonableness” or what counts as “reasons” to become so vague and broad
that it is trivial. Thus, the virtue epistemologist, the reliabilist, and the
correspondence-truth theorist have reasons for rejecting Peircean inquiry,
namely that it is false. Therefore, it seems odd to say that offering such a
reason is consistent with Peircean inquiry.
The second concern with Talisse’s view is that even if Talisse is right
about the implicit acceptance of Peircean inquiry, it does not seem that the
democratic political organization he envisions is entailed by it. Talisse
believes that Peircean inquiry entails a deliberative democracy that not only
has the more standard:
[D]emocratic norms and institutions . . . [such as] norms of
equality, free speech, freedom of information, open debate,
protected dissent, access to decision-making institutions,
access to public education, and so on—there must be norms in
place of the sort often associated with radical democratic
views, such as norms and institutions that promote
participation, inclusion, and recognition. Further, there must
be institutions of distributive justice to eliminate as far as
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justice allows the material obstructions to democratic
citizenship. 112
The problem is that there are other forms of political organization that could
allow for epistemic perfectionism that are not only not democratic in the way
Talisse describes but may not be democratic at all.
The purpose of Peircean inquiry is to arrive at true beliefs about a
wide variety of topics.113 Further, on the Peircean view one can only arrive at
true beliefs if one inquires with others in a community and engages views
that are different or contrary to one’s own. Thus, all that is required for
inquiry to succeed is a vibrant public sphere where such discussions can
occur. Hence, the only political arrangement that is necessary for inquiry to
be successful is one that allows for just this type of public discussion, and it
need not be democratic. Consider the Prussia of Fredrick the Great, as viewed
by Kant: “Argue, as much as you want and about whatever you want, but
obey.”114 Such a circumstance is fully consistent with epistemic
perfectionism.115 After all the community of inquiry is able to aim at true
beliefs and be epistemically responsible believers, but they need not have any
political power at all—democratic or otherwise. Now certainly, such a society
might be unstable, and the vibrant public sphere of inquiry might actually
have an influence on political decisions and be broadly democratic in that
sense. However, the point remains that one can be an epistemic perfectionist
of the kind that Talisse and Peirce think we all are, and still not be committed
to a democratic political organization in the way that Talisse thinks we are.
In other words, the immanent critique of our epistemic beliefs does not carry
across to an immanent critique of our politics.
The final issue that arises with Talisse’s Peircean account is that even
if one grants that Talisse can answer the other worries, he has not solved the
problem that pluralism causes for deliberative democracy. The problem of
pluralism is a moral problem, not an epistemic one. The question is not
whether one should accept democratic politics because only within a
democracy can one be epistemically responsible, but whether the coercive
use of power which the polity wields is seen as legitimate by its citizens. So,
112
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even if citizens can deliberate about what policies should be instituted, and
deliberate about them within a community of scientific inquirers, there is no
reason to think that a policy that is instituted will be acceptable to all the
citizens. In fact, if pluralism is true, there is reason to think that it will not be
acceptable to all citizens, precisely because the Peircean conception of
democracy “is not immediately aimed at agreement or consensus” but instead
it “envisions an ongoing agonism between competing reasonable
claims . . . .”116 Importantly, what is missing is a decision procedure; a way
to close debate is not possible within the Peircean conception of democracy.
Thus, Talisse is forced into a dilemma: on one hand, if a democratic polity
has a decision procedure and a way to close debate, even if only for the time
being, then it is inconsistent with the ongoing agonism that Talisse envisions.
The decision that is reached might be reasonably rejectable by some of its
citizens—precisely because there is a plurality of reasonable moral, political,
and metaphysical positions a citizen can hold, even if all citizens hold the
same epistemic views. On the other hand, if a democratic polity continues in
its ongoing agonism of competing claims, then the polity will be functionally
worthless since no policy, or very few, will ever be instituted. Either way, the
polity will be illegitimate: partially illegitimate in the former case, since not
all citizens will see the decisions made and instituted as legitimate uses of
coercion, and fully illegitimate in the latter case, since it is doubtful that any
citizen would find such a polity acceptable.
In essence, Talisse has not addressed pluralism, but side stepped it.117
Talisse fails to appreciate the full force of pluralism in another way as well.
As articulated by Rawls, the existence of pluralism is a permanent feature of
free societies.118 In order to avoid making inquiry futile, Talisse has to deny
that pluralism is a permanent feature. Epistemic perfectionism aims at beliefs
which are true, in the sense of being indubitable.119 The existence of a
plurality of reasonable comprehensive doctrines gives one a reason to think
that there is a reason to doubt all, or any, of them. If this were permanently
the case, then at least in many circumstances there would be little point in
engaging in inquiry since there could be no rational resolution to such a
situation. It is only if a rational resolution is at least, in principle, possible that
116

TALISSE, A PRAGMATIC PHILOSOPHY, supra note 52, at 90.
See generally id.
118
Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, supra note 11, at 4.
119
See generally Clanton & Forcehimes, supra note 100.
117

2020

THINKING ABOUT DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY

157

inquiry could, or should occur. Thus, Talisse is actually denying pluralism,
reasonable or otherwise. Indeed, he only accepts that people do hold a variety
of beliefs and doctrines, and there is an epistemic benefit to this, namely that
it encourages inquiry.120 Talisse is correct to claim that it might be an open
question whether a strong and permanent version of pluralism is in fact
obtainable, but in order for one to accept the Peircean account Talisse puts
forward, one must assume that it does not.
IV.

SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRATIC THEORY

Thus far, the discussion has focused on the expository or critical.
However, this focus was in service of a larger goal. By looking at the two
forms of deliberative democracy discussed here, and highlighting some of
their strengths and weaknesses, it is possible to identify some criteria—or at
least some good-making features—for an adequate deliberative democratic
theory. In this section of the article, some of these possible features will be
discussed. To be clear, this note will not put forward an alternative
deliberative democratic account. Rather, it will suggest ways that one can
evaluate any deliberative democratic theory. It might turn out that no
deliberative democratic theory can satisfy all the suggestions that will be
made, but any theory which can satisfy more, would appear to be ceteris
paribus a better theory.121
Again, one of the most important things a deliberative democratic
theory must be able to do is be able to cope with the existence of pluralism.
Further, whether or not pluralism is a permanent feature of a free society, an
adequate theory must be able to both provide normative reasons for citizens
to deliberate and be able to justify any policies the polity makes to all its
citizens, on the assumption that pluralism is a permanent feature. As
discussed, Rawls fails on both counts, and Talisse seems to do somewhat
better, but ultimately fails.
Related to the fact of pluralism is the issue of what is to be done about
persistent disagreement. In a free society of whatever size where there are a
plurality of doctrines, values and perspectives, the possibility of consensus
and agreement is virtually nil. Therefore, in a democratic society there must
be appropriate mechanisms in place to come to decisions but that at the same
120
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time leaves the ability to constantly and consistently reevaluate and
reconsider any decisions.122 Otherwise, the society would be completely
unacceptable. This will serve two purposes. First, it will allow for the
epistemic benefits which Talisse identified by engaging alternative views to
reach better decisions. Second, this will make decisions more acceptable to
those who disagree with them, since if they realize that they can continue to
argue against a decision, and have the possibility of affecting further
decisions, then it does not seem that the decision would be illegitimate in the
same way that more permanent decisions might be.
Talisse is right about his ongoing agonism but failed to have the
mechanisms in place for coming to a decision. Relatedly, Rawls sought to
avoid modus vivendi situations.123 An adequate deliberative theory should not
necessarily reject such compromises; in fact, if consensus is unlikely, at times
negotiation and compromise might be the best option available. However,
certain norms need to be accepted by all citizens for agonism to be fruitful.
In particular:
[I]mpetus needs to be given toward the liberalizing of
democracy’s tradition of tolerance to more effective
protection and integration of minority and non-conformist
groups, for the protection of the majority itself against
illiberalism, bigotry and cultural conceit, and toward the
tempering of the quality of patriotism and sub-group
loyalties.124
In other words, the main virtue of a democratic citizen is not reciprocity, or
civility, but tolerance. Tolerance is a weaker norm and thus more likely to be
acceptable. Further, even if Talisse is not entirely correct about the
relationship between epistemic perfectionism and epistemic responsibility,125
he does not seem to be entirely wrong either. Tolerance is what is actually
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required to get his agonism off the ground and seems to be necessary if
alternative views will even be considered.
Tolerance, unlike some of the epistemic norms Talisse considers, is
also a moral norm and is thus a better response to pluralism, even if epistemic
norms might provide a way for motivating why citizens should deliberate at
all.126 Further, if Talisse is right, it is the epistemic norms of responsible
believing that entail tolerance, even if they do not entail democracy. This
brings up the next feature of a deliberative democratic theory. Deliberative
democrats ought to avoid trying to justify democracy as such; instead,
democracy should be assumed on grounds of justice. Any political
arraignment that does not allow citizens the ability to affect the decisions that
affect their lives is prima facie unjust. Only democracy allows all citizens this
ability; therefore, only democracies are prima facie just. In other words, a
deliberative democratic theory should justify itself as a superior democratic
theory—democracy itself should be taken for granted. In this way, the
deliberative democratic is not fighting on two fronts; defending both
democracy, in general, and deliberative democracy.
An implication here is integral to democracy and justice is something
like an “all affected principle.”127 Anyone affected by a decision or policy
should have some say in that decision or policy. Worded differently, there
should be some way to shape those decisions and policies that affect one’s
life. Notice that if the “all affected principle” holds, then in a deliberative
democracy there must be multiple fora where debate can occur, and these fora
will be at various levels of political influence—national, sub-national, and
transnational. Therefore, an adequate deliberative democratic theory must
allow for deliberation about a wide range of issues and cannot be bound to
deliberation only within certain pre-determined boundaries—both actual and
metaphorical.
One final idea that can be gleaned from Talisse is that the epistemic
norms he discusses, and epistemic considerations generally,128 might provide
good reasons for citizens to deliberate, despite the fact that those same norms
do not necessarily entail democracy. Thus, by putting democracy and justice
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first, the deliberative democrat can then argue for the superiority of a
deliberative theory over other democratic theories based on epistemic norms
and benefits. In this way, the ideal deliberative democratic theory can include
both primarily moral norms such as justice and toleration, and more pervasive
epistemic norms as justifications for its overall account.
CONCLUSION
This article has been an investigation of deliberative democratic
theory. By carefully considering two particular accounts, namely Rawls’ and
Talisse’s, important insights regarding some good-making features of any
adequate deliberative theory were made. By highlighting the inadequacies of
Rawls’ and Talisse’s theories, one can come to understand what the broad
outlines of a deliberative democratic theory should be. In particular, any
adequate deliberative democratic theory must account for at least three
things. First, it should be able to address the problem of pluralism, and the
response to pluralism must be both moral and epistemic. Second, while being
cognizant of the epistemic benefits of deliberation, moral norms need to play
an important role, in particular questions of justice. Third, it must be able to
motivate deliberation and account for the legitimacy of decisions across a
wide range of issues, sites, and scales of deliberation—which entails on the
one hand the acceptability of compromise and negotiation, and on the other
the creation of institutions on the sub-national, national, and transnational
scale.
Although Talisse’s justification for a deliberative democracy was not
completely successful, there is something to his strategy that other
deliberative democrats should take seriously. The use of an immanent
critique of our democratic commitments will prove the best way of defending
and motivating a deliberative democratic theory. This follows from the
suggestion made above, that in one’s theorizing one should take a
“democracy first” attitude. Then, by investigating what we take democracy
to be, deliberation, discussion, toleration, an “all affected principle” and so
forth should naturally follow merely from the idea of democracy itself. If
Talisse proved nothing else it was that justifying democracy, as such, will
always run into problems. Interestingly, putting democracy first may solve
additional problems, or at least suggest solutions. For example, what counts
as reasonable, acceptable or legitimate will be explained in reference to what
we understand a democracy should be.
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Again, the intention is not to defend a particular deliberative theory,
rather, to suggest a way forward for deliberative democracy and to offer some
criteria by which particular versions of deliberative democracy may be
evaluated. Importantly, these criteria were identified through evaluating other
theories, and in that way the criteria are not arbitrary. The features put forth
are by no means exhaustive, and it may turn out that no deliberative theory
will be able to satisfactorily address them all. To the degree that a theory can,
it will suggest the superiority of that theory in relation to others.

